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CREDITOR RIGHTSAND THE PUBLICINTEREST RESTRUCTURING
INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS BY JANIS SARRA (TORONTO:
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS, 2003) 340 pages.1
BY STEPHANIE BEN-ISHAI

2

Air Canada filed for protection under the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act3 on April 1, 2003 and the ongoing negotiations
surrounding the restructuring of the airline have implications for the public
interest. What exactly this interest is, how it should be balanced with the
interests of traditional creditors, and who should balance these competing
interests have been the subjects of ongoing debate in the media and among
bankruptcy practitioners. In Creditor Rights and the Public Interest:
Restructuring Insolvent Corporations, Janis Sarra suggests that the fluid
approach, which has been the hallmark of Canada's reorganization regime,
has generally worked effectively to balance multiple stakeholders' interests
and the public interest. Sarra makes the case for increased participatory
and decision-making rights for non-traditional stakeholders within the
existing system, focusing in particular on workers and the reliance interest
created by their human capital investment.
Creditor Rights and the Public Interest contributes to the virtually
non-existent body of academic work on the CCAA, the Canadian statute
enacted in 1933 that provided for the restructuring of insolvent
corporations with debt exceeding five million dollars. Recently, the CCAA
has emerged as a significant part of Canada's bankruptcy regime. It is a
short statute that leaves much of its procedural and decision-making
[CreditorRights and the PublicInterest].
2 Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. The author wishes to thank lain

Ramsay for discussions that produced helpful comments and insights and Jenny Siu for her research
assistance.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 [CcAA].
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discretion to negotiation between the judiciary, the debtor, and major
creditors. Unlike the U.S. regime, the Canadian bankruptcy regime is made
up of a patchwork of legislation including the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act,4 which also provides for the reorganization of insolvent corporations,
but does not stipulate a minimum debt requirement.
Sarra provides a clear introduction to both the BIA and the CCAA,
attempting to open the debate on Canadian bankruptcy and insolvency
policy and reform to insolvency outsiders. The methodology employed by
Sarra includes a review of court files and attendance at pre-hearing
meetings and hearings in CCAA cases heard by the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice, Commercial List between 1998 and 2002. In addition, Sarra
interviewed more than sixty individuals in five provinces who were recently
involved in CCAA proceedings, including insolvency practitioners, managers,
workers, trade union representatives, and judges.
Viewed as an advocacy piece in favor of the existing facilitative role
of the judiciary and other intermediaries in the CCAA process, this book is
highly effective. It is an excellent platform for vigorous debate on one
aspect of Canada's bankruptcy regime, particularly in the context of the
current federal parliamentary review of the CCAA and the BIA.6 The danger
of the book lies in the fact that it is the only recent academic commentary
on the CCAA and thus may be seen as an authoritative text rather than an
advocacy piece.
I.

ENTERPRISE VALUE MAXIMIZATION

Sarra embraces an enterprise wealth maximization theory that is
based on the premise that a corporation or enterprise is made up of
interests broader than those of traditional creditors and shareholders. This
theory has been used in a corporate governance context to argue that
directors and officers can take a broader set of stakeholder interests into
account when fulfilling their corporate mandate. Corporate governance
scholars have suggested that the consequences of business failure to
stakeholders such as employees and suppliers are serious as these groups

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as am. by S.C. 1997, c.12
[BIA].
Ibid. Part III, Division
1.
6 The Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce held hearings on the operation and
administration of the BIA and CCAA in the spring of 2003 and issued its report in November 2003. See
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and Creditors
Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors'
ArrangementAct, November 2003.
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often lack alternative markets for their skills and products.' At the same
time, these stakeholders can directly affect the profits or losses of the
corporation. Accordingly, wealth maximization can only be achieved
through the inclusion of human capital and other kinds of firm specific
investments in corporate decision-making, rather than simply considering
the existing capital claims on the corporation's assets.8
Transferring enterprise wealth maximization theory to the
bankruptcy and insolvency context, Sarra argues that the reorganization
process should be the forum where all such interests can be heard prior to
a corporation being restructured. Sarra labels this approach, which
transcends the solvency of the corporation, as "enterprise value
maximization."
Enterprise value maximization theory is indifferent to whether a
corporation should reorganize or liquidate. However, it suggests that
decision-makers need to consider a broader range of stakeholder interests.
In making the case for greater participatory and decision rights for nontraditional stakeholders, Sarra relies heavily on the observation that despite
the fact that shareholders often retain no equity in insolvent corporations,
Canadian courts have been unwilling to divest them of decision-making
rights during restructuring. Therefore, other interests that are not strictly
defined by capital claims should also be accorded participation rights.
Sarra suggests that in a CCAA reorganization, non-traditional
stakeholder interests can be divided into two types. The first type, which the
law currently recognizes, is capital claims. Capital claims include claims for
unpaid wages, vacation pay, tax arrears, orders for environmental clean up,
and damages for torts. The second type of claim, which is legally
unrecognized, includes firm-specific human capital investments, the cost of
environmental harm to future land use and local community dependence
on that use, and costs to local creditors and local economies from lost
merchant trade. Sarra suggests that this second type of interest has been
referred to by Canadian courts in the broad context of the public interest,
but has not been formally recognized or quantified. She argues that such
equitable claims (not to be confused with equity) need to be quantified and
formally recognized in the CCAA process.
This book focuses primarily on workers who are characterized as
non-traditional stakeholders in a CCAA reorganization. From this worker
Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governancefor the Twenty-First
Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995) at 209-210.
8 Bernard Black, "Corporate Law and Residual Claimants" (Columbia University School of Law
and Economic Studies, 1996) [working paper] at 19, 36 (cited in CreditorRights and the Public Interest,
supra note 1 at 48).
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model, Sarra extrapolates arguments to account for other non-traditional
stakeholders. She suggests that workers' equitable claims maybe calculated
as the present value of what those workers reasonably expected would be
the return on their human capital investment had their firm not become
insolvent. The value calculated should be translated into voting and
participation rights in the restructuring process. Participation would take
the form of involvement in negotiations and the court supervised process,
as well as the ability to participate in creditor committees. These rights
would complement the fixed capital claims for employee contracts and
statutory benefits that workers already have under the CCAA. If there is a
successful turnaround, even though the value of workers' equitable claims
have the potential of being reduced to zero, workers should be entitled to
a proportional amount of the value generated in the reorganization in a
fashion similar to the treatment of shareholders.
The rationale behind this formula is that, unlike traditional
creditors, workers do not have the bargaining power to insist on disclosure
of potential firm failure before making contracts. Further, employees
cannot easily protect themselves because of informational asymmetries,
lack of bargaining power, and limited employment choices; they cannot
diversify their investment like a shareholder or raise the cost of credit based
on their assessment of risk like a creditor. Also, if the debtor corporation
is between collective bargaining negotiations, the corporation is under no
statutory obligation to negotiate with the union for additional protection.
In response to traditional creditors who question how her model
would benefit them, Sarra suggests that adopting the enterprise value
maximization objective would encourage efficient production through
enhanced use of organizational capital, reduced informational asymmetries,
and reduced agency costs, which would in turn minimize the losses
associated with financial distress and reduce the overall costs of capital.
II.

RESPONSE TO ENTERPRISE VALUE MAXIMIZATION

A.

Human CapitalInvestment

Sarra's goal of taking into account workers' human capital
investments in the context of a CCAA restructuring, which has implications
for deferred returns in the form of future wages and other benefits, is
laudable. However, it is based on an assumption of reliance, which may no
longer hold true in today's labour market. Given that the average job
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tenure is forty-four months, 9 the extent of workers' reliance on this deferred
return on their human capital investment is questionable. Even if one
accepts that workers still rely on a deferred return on their human capital
investment, a more nuanced understanding of which workers' interests are
valued would be helpful.
In both the description and application of Sarra's model in the case
studies, it appears that she is making the case for a class of stakeholders
whose interests are in fact already included in the existing CCAA scheme. It
is unclear why reform efforts should focus on quantifying these workers'
interests. In addition, Sarra does not distinguish between different
industries and types of workers-for example, those industries that depend
more on human capital versus those that depend more on structural capital.
In industries that depend most on human capital or talent, workers are
clearly in the best position to extract the most profits from the corporation
for themselves. Such workers are unlikely to remain loyal to employers and
can easily obtain new employment. Accordingly, such workers would be
accorded very little in the way of decision and participation rights under
Sarra's formula.
At the other end of the spectrum, the structural capital dependent
industries that Sarra focuses on appear to be those that are unionized and
offer private employer pension plans to their employees. Sarra's case
studies suggest that the interests of such workers are already collectivized
in two ways. First, such workers are represented by unions, who already
value the investments made by workers in the manner that Sarra suggests
and accord participation and decision rights in the union. Based on the case
studies presented by Sarra, it appears that unions are already gaining
recognition in the context of CCAA proceedings beyond what their fixed
capital claims would accord them. Second, as courts become increasingly
willing to allow for shareholder participation in a CCAA restructuring
process, their interests are again collectively represented. As Sarra points
out, North America's largest shareholders are the pension funds, which
largely invest the savings of these same workers.
Sarra's analysis and formula may be increasingly useful in the
context of the thousands of BIA proposals each year that implicate the
interests of non-unionized low-wage workers employed by smaller
corporations that do not offer private employer pension plans. Such
Statistics Canada, The People,Job Tenure (Canada: Statistics Canada, 2003), online:
Canada eBook <http://142.206.72.67/02/02e/02e_001b_e.htm>. The average job tenure for those aged 15-24 is
shorter, with an average of seventeen months in 1998, while the job tenure for those aged 25-44 is
approximately seventy-seven months. See Mark MacKinnon, "Women gaining ground in work force:
Better education is bringing more employment opportunities, longer job tenure, improving pay" The
Globe and Mail (19 April 1999) (WL).
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workers do not see their interests collectively represented either as
shareholders in pension plans or as members of unions. Such workers are
more likely to be women, single parents, immigrants, the disabled, visible
minorities, and part-time workers with no benefit entitlements.'l These are
the workers who do not have the bargaining power to protect their rights.
Sarra observes that in 2001, over 2000 commercial proposals to
restructure or compromise debt in order to avoid bankruptcy were filed by
smaller corporations under the BIA. While Sarra suggests that reliable
statistics are not available, one may estimate that the number of CCAA
proposals is significantly lower."t The BIA process is highly rule driven and
is overseen by a trustee in bankruptcy rather than the court, thus reducing
the costs of negotiation and court appearances. For these reasons, Sarra
suggests that the BIA proposal provisions do not pose the same kind of
challenges as the CCAA in discerning the public interest in the workout
process. Sarra suggests that because the court provides judicial oversight of
the restructuring process under the CCAA, the issue of balancing the rights
of creditors with the public interest arises.
While BIA proposals do not implicate the employment of thousands
of workers in each instance, collectively the number of jobs and the human
capital investment at risk with limited representation and decision rights
beyond strict capital claims may approach the levels found under the CCAA.
Further empirical work needs to be done to understand the nature of the
interests implicated under the CCAA as compared to BIA commercial
proposals and how a more codified system operates to balance these
interests as compared to the more fluid CCAA. One regime cannot be
studied in isolation of the other where the goal is to recognize a diverse
range of stakeholder interests. Even within the CCAA, further work needs
to be done to consider how the interests of unionized workers with pension
plans are balanced with and against those without pension plans.

In 1997,91 per cent of Canadian men were entitled to receive CPP/QPP benefits and 51 per cent
of Canadian men had a private pension. By comparison, 75 per cent of Canadian women were entitled
to receive CPP/QPP benefits and 25 per cent of Canadian women had a private pension. See Chris Eby,
"Income gap between the sexes closing: StatsCan" NationalPost (12 December 2000) at A4.
According to Industry Canada, there were 1888 commercial proposals under the BIA in
2002
and, on average, approximately 20 CCAA cases peryear for the previous three years. Presentation to the
Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce on the statutory review of the BIA and the CCAA, 7 May
2003,
online:
< http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inbsfosb.nsf/vwGeneratedl nterE/h_br01368e.html>.
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B.

A Plea for Change?

This book is not a plea for change. Sarra states that "enterprise
wealth maximization as a substantive objective of insolvency law can be
12z
effected under current insolvency and corporations statutory language.
She suggests that the current role of the judiciary is to successfully facilitate
the objectives of bankruptcy legislation by reconciling the interests of equity
and credit. The existing regime and the role of the judiciary does not need
to be overhauled to fit within Sarra's model. The only change required is
that courts take into account non-traditional stakeholder investments and
assets, assuring such stakeholders participatory rights in the process.
Based on the case studies that Sarra offers as examples, one is left
with the question of whether participation rights will be meaningful if the
hierarchy of traditional creditors' claims is preserved and judges are not
provided with a set of guidelines to consistently balance the public interest
with other interests. Although it is true that the symbolic politics of
recognizing such interests is important, it is questionable whether the
participation of a broader range of stakeholders will result in workers
sharing in any surplus of a restructured corporation through changed
governance structures, retained employment, or deferred wages. It may be
the case that workers are granted recognition and participation rights, but
the only parties to benefit are traditional creditors who can placate any
community concerns by appearing to take into account the public interest
and, at the same time, gain from the information that these workers can
provide. Future work may empirically test the nature of the gains that social
stakeholders reap from increased participation and decision rights in the
CCAA process and how these increased rights are accorded along the lines
of gender, race, class, and ability.
C.

Methodology

In what is clearly a novel attempt at creating a conceptual model for
the CCAA, the reader is left with the impression that the repeat participants
in the CCAA who are referenced here may have overstated their public
interest at different junctures. While Sarra does not set out to produce a
piece of socio-legal scholarship she has clearly invested much time in
interviewing numerous participants in CCAA proceedings. However, her
analysis of the CCAA, while firmly situated in American theoretical work,
does not probe beyond Canadian case law or anecdotal comments in papers

12 CreditorRights and the Public Interest, supra note

1at

101.
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produced by bankruptcy practitioners, with the result that the reader is
unable to see beyond the distorted picture that emerges after a CCAA
restructuring is completed.
CreditorRights and the Public Interest may be built upon by future
qualitative empirical work that explores the social and legal issues
implicated in a CCAA reorganization by way of transcribed interviews
conducted with judges, a diverse range of workers, tort claimants,
governments, community groups, environmental groups, women's groups,
and bankruptcy practitioners. It may be that the stakeholders to whose
interests Sarra seeks to give meaning are not interested in focusing their
efforts on such a process. For example, participants in Air Canada's CCAA
proceedings have made it clear that from their perspective, the best
outcome to protect the interests of all employees would have been through
a consensual process outside of a CCAA filing. t3
III.

CONCLUSION

Applying Sarra's enterprise value maximization model to the Air
Canada proceedings produces mixed results. It appears that the Air Canada
restructuring, up to the point of writing, has accorded significant
participation and decision rights to unions. The result of such rights was a
restriction of the power contained in the initial CCAA order that permitted
Air Canada to rewrite labor contracts pending negotiations between the
parties. t4 Justice Winkler was appointed to facilitate this out-of-court
negotiation." However, there continues to be a lack of informational
symmetry. The American-based restructuring experts hired by one of the
unions recently commented on their surprise at how little information was
available." Further, in order to fund such restructuring efforts, the unions
are raising dues and have had to let go some of the restructuring staff they
hired.' 7 The government has not become involved as a significant
stakeholder or by way of financial contributions. Finally, no major changes
13 "Air Canada sets the record straight with respect to pension plans" Canada
NewsWire (3 April

2003).
14 See Paul Vieira, "Airline unions chalk up legal victory: Air Canada's ability to torpedo collective
bargaining agreements revoked by judge" National Post (23 April 2003) (WL). See also "Canadian auto
workers files court challenge to Air Canada" Canada NewsWire (16 April 2003).
15 Susan Pigg, "How ajudge's plain speaking saved Air Canada; Justice Winkler man on mission
'Brought reason' to the negotiations" The Toronto Star (2 June 2003) (WL).
16 Rick Westhead, "Bankruptcy-court judge scolds Air Canada and unions over slow negotiations"
Canadian Press (16 May 2003) (WL).
17 ....
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appear to have been made to corporate governance practices or to the
composition of the Air Canada board.' 8
Together, the ongoing front-page newspaper material offered by
Air Canada's restructuring and Sarra's contribution to the dearth of
academic inquiry into the CCAA process provide a springboard for a lively
debate on the future shape of Canada's bankruptcy regime. Sarra's book
has opened up a space for insolvency outsiders to begin thinking about
bankruptcy policy-making and reform. The conceptual model that Sarra
thoughtfully develops throughout this book provides the groundwork for
qualitative empirical work that further tests the implications of her
conceptual model. Sarra is to be congratulated for a groundbreaking
contribution to what will hopefully become a sustained area of academic
inquiry in Canada.

TOXIC CRIMINOLOGY ENVIRONMENT, LA WAND THE STATE IN
CANADA EDITED BY SUSAN C. BOYD, DOROTHY E. CHUNN &
ROBERT MENZIES (HALIFAX: FERNWOOD PUBLISHING, 2002)
127 pages.'
BY KRISTI Ross2
Because of an historical reluctance to examine global corporate and state crime and to
analyse underlying patterns of environmental destruction and human rights violations,
criminologists have contributed little to informed public discussion and debate about the
potentially terminal impact of environmental harms on the planet. Such discussion is ,3urgently
needed now to mobilize populations for struggles against "environmental suicide."

A dramatic beginning for a book that is essentially a call-to-arms for
critical criminologists, social justice activists, lawyers, and academics
interested in environmental issues and their interplay with class, race,
gender, and power. As a call-to-arms, this book addresses the need for
inter-disciplinary work in the field of environmental crime and provides a
starting point for new discourses to emerge. Appropriately, this edited
collection of essays is drawn from a wide range of disciplines: law, policy
18 Eric Reguly, "End the board games: Air Canada needs new directors" The Globe and Mail (26
April 2003) (WL).
[Toxic Criminology].
2 M.E.S./LL.B. 2003 Osgoode Hall Law School; Clerk, Federal Court of Appeal, 2003-2004.
Dorothy E. Chunn, Susan C. Boyd & Robert Menzies, "We all live in Bhopal: Criminology
Discovers Environmental Crime" in Toxic Criminology, supra note 1, 7 at 8.

